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Foster Parents' Emerging Due Process
Rights in Pennsylvania
I. Introduction
Foster family care is the temporary care by foster parents of
children whose parents are unable or unwilling to properly care for
them.' Under the auspices of the state,2 children, generally of lower
and lower-middle class natural families, are placed by foster care
agencies with lower-middle class foster families.' Children are re-
moved from their natural home by court order4 or pursuant to a vol-
untary agreement 5 between the natural parents and the foster care
agency.
One benefit of foster care is that natural parents are able to
work out the problems that necessitated their child's removal with
the aid of social welfare caseworkers and without the stress created
by normal parental duties.6 Irrespective of this benefit, the focus of
foster care is serving the child's best interest.7 Since this interest is
1. Rarely is a child removed from his home because of his own problems, but rather,
removal is "necessitated by the failure of parents to meet the needs of children." Geiser, The
Shuffed C/ld and Foster Care, 10 TRIAL No. 3, 27 (1974).
2. Although the concept of foster family care includes any substitute parenting of a
child not one's own, this comment will focus on state-created foster care programs rather than
on independent arrangements.
3. See Katz, LegalAspects ofFoster Care, 5 FAm. L.Q. 283, 284-85 (1971) (development
of foster care). See also Lewis, Foster Fwnmid Care: Has It Fuffdled Its Promise?, 355 ANNALS
- PROGRAMS AND PROBLEMS IN CHLD WELFARE 31 (1964).
4. By the authority of Pennsylvania's Juvenile Act of 1972 (No. 333) PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
11, §§ 50-101 et seq. (Purdon 1977), a child may be forcefully removed from his home. See
notes 21-24 and accompanying text infra.
5. Voluntary agreements are also known as entrustment agreements, and the terms will
be used interchangeably in this comment. See notes 25-28 and accompanying text infra,
6. In Pennsylvania the goals of foster care are as follows:
A. The purpose of foster-family care is to provide children with the experiences in
family living which are esential to their constructive growth and development
when their own parents are unable to provide this.
B: Foster family care is not intended to supersede parental rights, responsibilities,
and relationships but is intended to protect the rights of children.
C. The agency works with the child, his own family, and the foster family toward the
end that the child may be reestablished in his own home when this is feasible or
toward the best plan for the welfare of the child.
D. Foster homes are an extension of the agency, and there should be mutual under-
standing between the agency and the foster parents regarding the responsibilities
each carries in relation to the child in placement and his family.
E. The agency should have a sufficient number of approved foster homes available
so that selection of a home can be related both to the needs of the child and the
capacities of the foster parents.
Pa. Dept. of Public Welfare, C & Y MANAL tit. 4300, § 4302 (1969).
7. Id
presumably best served in his natural home' the goal is to return the
child as soon as possible.9 Unfortunately, foster care often becomes
long-term placement, including several transfers among foster
homes.' 0
When a child remains in a foster home for a long period of
time" the child and his foster parents often form strong attach-
ments. 2 This is particularly true when the child is placed shortly
after birth and his foster parents are the only parents he has known.
Because of their emotional bond, foster parents may seek to retain
custody when the agency attempts to remove the child from their
home."' In the past, foster parents' claims to custody were derived
solely through their satisfaction of the child's "best interest."' 4
Courts have been reluctant to award foster parents custody, espe-
cially when the agency intends to return the child to his natural par-
ents who enjoy a strong presumption in their favor.' In recent
years, however, courts have become more receptive to foster parents'
petitions for continued custody.' 6 Concurrently, statutory regula-
tions have afforded foster parents more due process protection in
preremoval procedures. 7
A recent, novel appeal for custody was pleaded in Smith v. Or-
8. See 14 DuQ. L. REv. 284 (1976).
9. In Pennsylvania the goals defined in note 6 supra have been recently affirmed as
follows:
The goals of these social services are to maintain and increase family stability, to
keep children in their own families and, when temporary placement out of the home
is necessary, to maintain the child's relationship with his/her family and community
life while striving to return the child home as soon as possible.
7 PA. BULL No. 53, at 4039 (Dec. 31, 1977).
10. According to Gioffre, Report of the Task Group on Rights and Responibilities of Per-
sons in the Foster Care System (Jan. 1978), in Pennsylvania the average length of placement
for a foster child is 3.5 years. The longer the child remains in foster care, the more likely that
the child will be returned to foster care or never re-united with his parents. See Wald, State
Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected' ChildreL Standards/or Removal of Children from Their
Homes, Monitoring the Statws of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights,
28 STAN. L. REv. 623, 662 (1976), in which the writer states, "While the figures vary from state
to state, the available data indicate that between 40 percent and 80 percent of all children
presently removed from home by court order are never returned to their parents." See
generally Geiser, supra note 1; Levine, Caveat Parens: Demystifcation of the Child Protection
System, 35 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 1 (1973).
11. The time period required for an emotional bond to develop depends on the child's
age, maturity, and previous foster care experience, among other factors.
12. For an excellent discussion of the psychological ramifications of the foster care rela-
tionship, see J. GOLDSTEIN, A FREUD, A. SOLNrr, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1973). In particular, these authors explain that the foster parents may come to replace the
function of the natural parents in satisfying the child's emotional needs. In this event, the
foster parents become the child's "psychological parents."
13. It is noted that there may be other motives such as pity for the child.
14. The "best interests" of the child is a general welfare standard referring to the physi-
cal, mental, and moral welfare of the child. See In re LaRue, 244 Pa. Super. Ct. 218, 226, 366
A.2d 1271, 1275 (1976) (description and applicability of "best interests" standard).
15. 14 DUQ. L. REv. 284, 288-89 (1976).
16. See, e.g., Stapleton v. Dauphin County Child Care Serv., 228 Pa. Super. Ct. 371, 324
A.2d 562 (1974); see also Note, 36 U. PITT. L. REv. 715 (1975) (discussion of Stapleton).
17. See notes 42-49 and accompanying text infra
ganization of Foster Families/or Equality and Reform, '8 in which fos-
ter parents asserted a right, independent of the child's, to protection
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. They
claimed a liberty interest in the protection of the foster family for
which certain procedural safeguards were required. Even though
the Supreme Court decided the case on statutory grounds, Smith
could have an important impact on foster parents' rights. This com-
ment will examine foster parents' emerging rights in the context of
Pennsylvania's foster care system. Pennsylvania's statutory and reg-
ulatory scheme will be discussed, and foster parents' emerging rights
under the due process clause will be analyzed, including a close ex-
amination of Smith and the cases that construe it. Finally, the po-
tential impact of these developing rights on Pennsylvania's system
will be explored.
II. Pennsylvania's Foster Care System
Foster family care is a state-created and substantially state-
funded'9 program of aid to children and their parents, which is coor-
dinated by the Department of Public Welfare2° but administefed on
the county level. The parties involved in the child's placement are
the foster care agency, the natural parents, and the foster parents.
A. Removal From Natural Home
A child may be involuntarily or voluntarily removed from his
natural parents' custody and placed with the foster care agency.
Before the child may be involuntarily removed Pennsylvania's Juve-
nile Act of 1972 (No. 333) requires a judicial determination that the
child is "deprived"2 and proof of "clear necessity"22  for the re-
18. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
19. The State pays 75% of the costs of foster care and reimburses the county foster care
agency for the costs of placement, supervision, and maintenance. Natural parents are ex-
pected to support their children in foster homes according to their ability to pay. Federal
monies may also be involved through the Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program
(AFDC). 7 PA. BULL. No. 53, at 4041, 4050 (Dec. 31, 1977).
20. The Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare defines foster care as "a social serv-
ice which provides substitute family life for a planned period of time for a child who has to be
separated from his natural or legal parents." Pa. Dep't. of Pub. Welfare, C & Y MANUAL tit.
4300, § 4301 (1969).
21. "Clear and convincing" evidence that the child is "deprived" is required for the child
to be involuntarily removed. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 50-102(4), 50-320(c) (Purdon 1977).
Although the statute uses the term "dependent" to include more than deprivation, the courts
often employ the statutory definition of dependent when referring to deprived children. A
"dependent child" is a child who,
(i) is without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as required
by law, or other care or control necessary for his physical, mental, or emo-
tional health, or morals; or
(ii) has been placed for care or adoption in violation of law, or
(ii) has been abandoned by his parents, guardian, or other custodian; or
moval.23 Upon these findings the court will award temporary legal
custody of the child to the foster care agency if this would be in the
child's best interest.24 If the parents voluntarily25 place the 'child
with the agency, they will sign a revocable entrustment agreement
26
that confers legal custody with the agency. Upon the natural par-
ents' revocation the agency must petition the court as in an involun-
tary removal case and reaffirm its legal custody by court order.
Otherwise, it must promptly return the child.27 The presumption that
the child's best interests are served in his natural parents' custody is
rebutted only by an adjudication of deprivation. Therefore, when
the child is placed pursuant to court order or retained in foster care
after a finding of deprivation, the natural parents must prove that
their restored custody will enhance the child's welfare. Clearly, it is
(iv) is without a parent, guardian, or legal custodian; or
(v) while subject to compulsory school attendance is habitually and without
justification truant from school.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-102(4) (Purdon 1977).
22. In PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 50-101(b)(3), 50-321 (Purdon 1977), the statute refers to
.necessary" removal, which has been construed by courts to mean "clear necessity." See note
23 Mfra.
23. See In re Clouse, 244 Pa. Super. Ct. 396, 368 A.2d 780 (1976); In re LaRue, 244 Pa.
Super. Ct. 218, 366 A.2d 1271 (1976); Stapleton v. Dauphin County Child Care Serv., 228 Pa.
Super. Ct. 371, 324 A.2d 562 (1974); In re Rinker, 180 Pa. Super. Ct. 143, 117 A.2d 780 (1955).
24. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-321(a)(2) (Purdon 1977). State intrusion into the family is
predicated upon high judicial standards. As the court explained in In re Rinker, 180 Pa.
Super. Ct. 143, 148, 117 A.2d 780, 783 (1955),
It is a serious matter for the long arm of the state to reach into a home and snatch a
child from its mother. It is a power which a government dedicated to freedom for
the individual should exercise with extreme care, and only where the evidence clearly
establishes its necessity. Yet, of course, there are cases where such authority must be
exercised for the protection and welfare of children.
See also Milligan v. Davison, 244 Pa. Super. Ct. 255, 367 A.2d 299 (1976); In re Custody of
Myers, 242 Pa. Super. Ct. 225, 363 A.2d 1242 (1976); In re DeSavage, 241 Pa. Super. Ct. 174,
360 A.2d 237 (1976).
25. See Levine, supra note 10. The author contends that in many cases "voluntary"
transfer of legal custody is really the product of threat, coercion, or misinformation or bias of
caseworkers. Levine further suggests that caseworkers are often guilty of a "child-rescuing"
moralism and of not respecting the rights of natural parents. Id at 16-17.
26. See Lee v. Child Care Serv. Del. County Inst. Dist., 461 Pa. 641, 337 A.2d 586 (1975),
(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld voluntary placement agreements as not in violation of
natural parents due process rights); see also In re LaRue, 244 Pa. Super. Ct. 218, 235, 366
A.2d 1271, 1280 (1976) (Cercone, J., concurring). In re LaRue Justice Cercone said,
Entrustment agreements do not 'disrupt' the child-parent relationship; they merely
evidence the fact that the parent has decided that the child's interests will best be
served, temporarily, by placing him in the custody of CWS [Child Welfare Service].
Entrustment agreements, therefore, offer flexibility to the statutory scheme which re-
quires a deprivation hearing if the natural parents do not consent to placing the child
with CWS. Furthermore, since a finding of deprivation has the effect of stigmatizing
the natural parent, very often a consensual entrustment agreement of a child will be
far less disruptive to the future of a parent-child relationship than a deprivation hear-
ing would be.
Id at 236-37, 366 A.2d at 1280. Cq In re LaRue, 244 Pa. Super. Ct. 218, 237, 366 A.2d 1271,
1281 (1976) (Hoffman, J., dissenting) (entrustment agreements defeat parents' rights to cus-
tody). See generalo, Geiser, supra note 1, at 27, 29 (deprivation hearings arouse strong feel-
ings of anger, resentment and bitterness in the natural parents, which makes it less likely that
the parents will reclaim their children).
27. In re LaRue, 244 Pa. Super. Ct. 218, 366 A.2d 1271 (1976).
much more difficult for a natural parent to regain custody when his
child has been adjudicated deprived.2"
Throughout these attempts to regain custody, the agency retains
legal custody of the child. The natural parent, however, still holds
some basic parental rights of consent.29 In addition, the natural par-
ents are expected to visit the child regularly in the foster home and
help the agency with long-term planning for the child.30
B. Placement with Foster Parents
After acquiring legal custody the foster care agency attempts
quickly to place the child with foster parents who are carefully
screened for their compatability with the child.3 Foster parents are
usually paid for their services, which include daily supervision of the
child and provision of adequate food and clothing. The agency,
however, maintains ultimate decision-making authority for emer-
gency medical care, change in placement, placement plan objectives,
and school curriculum.32 In addition, the agency maintains some
control over the foster parents through its legal right to veto deci-
sions made by foster parents about the child. As a last resort in
controlling the foster care relationship, the agency may remove the
28. The court in Stapleton v. Dauphin County Child Care Serv., 228 Pa. Super. Ct. 371,
324 A.2d 562 (1974), explained that once the child has been adjudicated deprived the standard
of "clear necessity" is no longer applicable. The unity of the family has already been de-
stroyed.
29. These include the right to
1. Consent to marriage
2. Consent to enlistment in the armed forces
3. Consent to major medical, surgical, and psychiatric treatment
4. Consent to officially change religious affiliation
5. Consent to obtain a driver's license [and]
6. Consent to enter binding financial agreements, Le., promissory note for attending
higher educational institutions.
Gioffre, supra note 10, at 9-10.
30. Unjustified failure to do these things may constitute grounds for involuntary termina-
tion of natural parents' rights to their child. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 311 (Purdon 1977).
31. For details of selection of foster homes, see Pa. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, C & Y MAN-
UAL tit. 4300, § 4312 (1969). Once the home is selected, the foster agency assigns a caseworker
to it who shall,
1. Prepare the foster family for accepting the child into the home.
2. Have regular contacts with the foster parents, at least every two months, and
more often when indicated, to assist them in carrying out their responsibilities
toward the child.
3. Assist the foster family in understanding and accepting the role of the child's own
parents in the child's life.
4. Prepare the foster family for changes in plans for the child.
Id But see Geiser, supra note 1, at 35. Geiser states,
There is little or no preparation or support for foster parents. A few meet the child
before his placement; the rest do not. Three-quarters of the foster parents don't real-
ize or are completely unaware of the extent of the handicaps of the child who will be
placed with them. Only a handful receive any training prior to the child's placement.
Foster parents also rarely see a social worker after placement.
32. Gioffre, supra note 10, at 18.
child from the foster home if it later determines that the home is
unsuitable.33
C Rights of Foster Parents
Should the agency attempt to remove the child from the foster
home, Pennsylvania provides foster parents some due process pro-
tection in their relationship with the agency. Unless foster parents
voluntarily turn over the child upon the agency's request, in which
event their position becomes that of a "mere stranger or volunteer'
with no standing,' foster parents have statutory authority to contest
the agency's decision for removal.35  Their standing is secured by
the Juvenile Act of 1972 (No. 333), which states that "any interested
person" may be a party to a custody dispute.36 In addition to the
statutory right to participate in a custody dispute based on the Act,
the Attorney General of Pennsylvania has issued an opinion37 that
foster parents have a statutory right to a preremoval hearing based
on both local agency law38 and administrative agency law.39  Fur-
thermore, foster parents have the right to seek a stay order that en-
ables them to retain custody of the child during the custody
proceeding.' According to foster care regulations, this right in-
33. Any agency may seek to relocate the child in another foster home if it determines that
relocation would be "appropriate and desirable." Pa. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, C & Y MANUAL
tit. 4300, § 4362(B) (1975). No other guidelines are set forth except that the child may be
immediately removed to protect him from abuse or neglect. Id § 4361(D). The result of this
indefiniteness is that children may be removed for a variety of reasons. It is particularly
noteworthy that a child may be removed if the agency determines that the foster parents have
become too emotionally attached. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality
and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 818 n.1 (1977).
34. In Commonwealth ex rel Ebel v. King, 162 Pa. Super. Ct. 533, 58 A.2d 484 (1948),
foster parents voluntarily relinquished the child to the agency, which planned to transfer the
child to another foster home. Then, the fosterparents filed a writ of habeas corpus to regain
custody, but the court denied the action. The court said that the foster parents executed the
foster care contract by handing over the child, and that the court could not consider the best
interests of the child. The foster parents had lost their rights under the contract and had legal
rights to custody no better than those of a stranger.
35. Foster parents generally sign a contract with the foster care agency agreeing not to try
to obtain adoption or guardianship. As the court said in Stapleton v. Dauphin County Child
Care Serv., 228 Pa. Super. Ct. 371, 381, 324 A.2d 562, 568 (1974), such a contract is "voidable
by the courts when the best interests of the child conflict with it." See Commonwealth ex re.
Children's Aid Soc'y v. Gard, 362 Pa. 85, 92, 66 A.2d 300, 304 (1949); Commonwealth ex rel
Bankert v. Children's Servs., 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 556, 307 A.2d 411 (1973); Commonwealth ex
reL Berg v. Catholic Bureau, 167 Pa. Super. Ct. 514, 76 A.2d 427 (1950); XV WILLISTON,
CoNTRACTS § 1744A (1972); see also In re Custody of Rosenthal, 103 Pa. Super. Ct. 27, 157 A.
342 (1931) (relationship of parent and child is a status, not a property right). See generall,
Levin, supra note 10.
36. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 50-302, 50-314 (Purdon 1977). See Stapleton v. Dauphin
County Child Care Serv., 228 Pa. Super. Ct. 371, 324 A.2d 562 (1974); 4.q Ciammaichella
Appeal, 369 Pa. 278, 85 A.2d 406 (1952) (in action brought by natural parents against the
agency, foster parents were allowed to intervene and litigate at all stages of the proceedings).
•37. 4 PA. BULL. No. 27, at 1334-1335 (June 29, 1974).
38. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11302 e seq. (Purdon 1977).
39. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 1710.1 et seq. (Purdon 1977).
40. The court in Stapleton v. Dauphin County Child Care Serv., 228 Pa. Super. Ct. 37 1,
cludes retention pending appeal.4'
In 1975 the Department of Public Welfare published amend-
ments to foster care regulations that more clearly define foster par-
ents' due process protections in custody disputes and their rights
during the foster care experience.42  First, no child may be placed in
foster care unless a written agreement is executed between the
agency and the foster parents that details plans for the child while in
foster care. 3 Second, foster parents must be notified of the agency's
intent to relocate the child.44 Third, foster parents are entitled to an
informal preremoval hearing upon request, at which they may be
accompanied by a "spokesman of their choice. ' 4  The burden of
proof at the hearing "shall be upon the agency to establish that the
proposed relocation is the least detrimental long-term placement al-
ternative."'  Last, foster parents may appeal the agency's deci-
sion.47  They have a right to paid legal counsel, to retain custody of
the child pending appeal,4 and to a further appeal to the Common-
384-85, 324 A.2d 562, 569 (1974), condoned the foster parents' action to obtain a stay order
and said,
[Tmhe Stapletons' decision to seek a legal determination of their status with respect to
Brent [the foster child] by filing a petition under the Juvenile Act, in the meantime
obtaining a stay order enabling them to retain custody of him, was a responsible
course of action, which the courts should encourage rather than discourage.
41. Pa. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, C & Y MANUAL tit. 4300, § 4363(B)(4) (1975).
42. Id §§ 4360 et seq. (1975).
43. A. No child shall be placed in foster family care by the agency unless:
I. Such placement is based on a written plan consented to by the foster parents and
agency. The child, natuural parents, and other interested parties shall be involved
in the planning process. Such plan shall include but not be limited to:
Reasons for placement.
Anticipated length of placement.
Health care for the child.
Social and education needs for the child.
Plan for visiting.
Plan for supervision of placement.
Mechanism for the revision of plan as needed.
Terms of reimbursement.
Id § 4361(A)(1) (1975).
44. When an agency determines that it would be appropriate and desirable to relo-
cate a child in foster family care, in addition to established casework practice, the
agency shall inform the foster parents by certified mail, return receipt requested.
Such notice of agency intention shall be by means of a letter prescribed by the De-
partment. . . .This letter notifying foster parents of the intention to relocate and of
their opportunity for prior hearing shall be sent on agency stationery. . . . Failure to
request a hearing will constitute a waiver of any rights pursuant to these regulations.
Id § 4362(B) (1975).
45. For the complete hearing procedure see id § 4363 (1975).
46. Id § 4363(A) (1975). By this choice of words, "least detrimental alternative," the
State may be recognizing that this is a more realistic standard than serving the child's "best
interest," because the child's separation from the foster home will likely be traumatic for all
involved.
47. Pa. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, C & Y MANUAL tit. 4300, § 4363(C) (1975).
48. Id By allowing the child to remain with the foster parents pending appeal, the State
is recognizing the child's need for a stable environment. In Sartoph v. Sartoph, 31 Md. App.
58, 67, 354 A.2d 467, 473 (1976), the court explained,
The custody of children should not be disturbed unless there is some strong rea-
wealth Court.49
These regulations are intended to protect the foster parents as
representatives of the child's interest. Foster parents' expanding
rights under the statutory system are unmistakably derivative.50
D. Derivative Custodial Rights of Foster Parents
While the child is in foster care, foster parents become his de
facto parents.5 Particularly in long-term placements, foster parents
may also become his "psychological parents,"52 replacing the natu-
ral parents in satisfying the child's emotional needs. In a custody
dispute between natural and foster parents the court will consider
this emotional attachment only when a determination was made that
the child was deprived.13  Otherwise, the child must be returned to
his natural parents without regard to his relationship with the foster
parents.- 4
Determining whose custody would best serve the child's welfare
is a delicate, difficult decision. The best interest of the child is not
determined by whom would provide the child the "better" home or
the more financially secure life.55 As the court explained in In re
son affecting the welfare of the child. To justify a change in custody, a change in
conditions must have occurred which affects the welfare of the child and not of the
parents. The reason for this rule is that the stability provided by the continuation of
a successful relationship with a parent who has been in day to day contact with a
child generally far outweighs any alleged advantage which might accrue to the child
as a result of a custodial change. In short, when all goes well with children, stability,
not change, is in their best interests.
See note 66 uMfra
49. Pa. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, C & Y MANuAL tit. 4300, § 4363(C)(3) (1975). See note
45 and accompanying text .wpra
50. Courts, however, have recognized that custody with the foster parents may serve the
child's best interest. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex re. Children's Aid Soc'y v. Gard, 362 Pa. 85,
66 A.2d 300 (1947); Commonwealth ex rel Bankert v. Children's Servs., 224 Pa. Super. Ct.
556, 307 A.2d 411 (1973).
51. In D'Auria v. Liposky, 197 Pa. Super. Ct. 271, 177 A.2d 133 (1962), the court ordered
a new trial because there was some evidence, which had not been considered by the lower
court, that would support a finding that the foster parents stood in loco parentis to the child.
In this case the foster child was suing the foster parents for money she alleged her foster
parents were saving for her. The court said,
While it does not appear that any of our decisions expressly sanction finding a rela-
tionship in loco parentis between foster parent and foster child, there is nothing in
our case which indicates that such a relationship could not arise, particularly in a
case where the foster parent has assumed or incurred substantial financial obligations
in raising the child.
197 Pa. Super. Ct. at 278-79, 177 A.2d at 136. See Commonwealth v. Cameron, 197 Pa.
Super. Ct. 403, 179 A.2d 270 (1962) (one standing in locoparentir to a minor child has the same
rights and responsibilities as between natural parent and child).
If foster parents successfully asserted the status of being in tocoparentis to the foster child,
they theoretically would have the same rights to custody that the natural parents had.
52. "Psychological parent" is a term referring to the person who satisfies a child's emo-
tional needs for warmth, love, and security. See note 12 supra
53. See notes 21-28 and accompanying text Jupra.
54. Id
55. In Commonwealth ex re. Grillo v. Shuster, 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 229, 312 A.2d 58
(1973) (custody dispute between the natural parents), the court affirmed the principle that the
relative wealth of the parties is irrelevant so long as the child is raised in a "decent manner."
Rinker, 56
A child cannot be declared 'neglected' merely because his condi-
tion might be improved by changing his parents. The welfare of
many children might be served by taking them from their homes
and placing them in what the officials might consider a better
home. But the Juvenile Court Law was not intended to provide a
procedure to take the children of the poor and give them to the
rich, nor to take the children of the illiterate and give them to the
educated, nor to take the children of the crude and give them to
the cultured, nor to take the children of the weak and sickly and
give them to the strong and healthy.5
Courts, however, are guided by the legislative statement of purpose
in the Juvenile Act, which declares that the court should preserve the
family unit when possible,58 but must protect the physical, mental,
and moral development of the child.59 Thus, the custody determi-
nation is likely to be a subjective judgment.'
In reaching a custody decision, Pennsylvania courts have in-
creasingly recognized that the child's best interest is served by cus-
tody with the psychological parent, who is frequently the foster
parent.6' These courts have determined that the "presumption in
favor of the natural parents may weaken with the passage of time.
' 62
In re John F 63 exemplifies judicial recognition of the foster parents'
important role in the child's life. In this case several children of the
natural family were placed in different foster homes pursuant to a
neglect determination. After many years of continuous foster care,
56. 180 Pa. Super. Ct. 143, 148, 117 A.2d 780, 783 (1955).
57. Id at 148, 117 A.2d at 783.
58. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-101 (Purdon 1977).
59. Id § 50-321 (Purdon 1977).
60. For a discussion of the court's considerations see In re LaRue, 244 Pa. Super. Ct. 218,
229, 366 A.2d 1271, 1276 (1976); See also Auman v. Eash, 228 Pa. Super. Ct. 242, 323 A.2d 94
(1974). Compare the dissent in fn re LaRue, 244 Pa. Super. Ct. 218, 252-53, 366 A.2d 1271,
1288-89 (1976) (Hoffman, J., dissenting) in which Justice Hoffman said that the court must
consider many factors in determining whether there are compelling reasons to continue foster
care including the following:
"facts and circumstances surrounding the [entrustment] agreement to determine if the
parents' rights to custody had been abused"; "efforts of the parents to preserve a
relationship with their child"; "effect of continued foster care on a child"; and "com-
parative ability of the two sets of parents to meet the physical, mental and emotional
needs of the child."
61. In Commonwealth v. Gard, 362 Pa. 85, 66 A.2d 300 (1949), the court, taking the
child's viewpoint, compared the removal of the foster child from an emotionally secure home
to kidnapping. The court in Stapleton v. Dauphin County Child Care Serv., 228 Pa. Super.
Ct. 371, 324 A.2d 562 (1974), held similar views. In In re Clouse, 244 Pa. Super. Ct. 396, 368
A.2d 780 (1976), the court found that the child's best interest would be served by continued
foster care because the probability of the mother being able to care for the child was so uncer-
tain. See also In re Adoption of R.I., 468 Pa. 287, 361 A.2d 294 (1976) (court granted foster
parents' petition to terminate the natural parents rights to permit foster parents to adopt child);
Commonwealth ex re. Donie v. Ferree, 175 Pa. Super. Ct. 586, 106 A.2d 681 (1954) (best
interests of child served in custody of foster parents rather than with grandmother).
62. Stapleton v. Dauphin County Child Care Serv., 228 Pa. Super. Ct. 371, 390, 324 A.2d
562, 572 (1974).
63. 125 P.LJ. 67 (1977).
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in each home the natural mother petitioned for custody feeling she
was now able to care for them. The court found that although the
natural mother was able to provide proper care for the children, her
custody would not benefit them. Therefore, the court refused to dis-
turb the excellent parent-child relationships that had developed be-
tween the children and their foster parents.
This analysis openly recognizes the importance of maintaining
the child's relationship with the parent who best satisfies the child's
emotional needs. The court explained the application of the best
interests test 64 thus,
Initially, the Court shall determine whether the child has de-
veloped a substitute parent-child relationship with the third party
with whom the child is placed. In making this determination, the
existing relationship between the natural parent and the child
shall be extremely relevant.
If it is determined that no substitute parent/child relationship
has developed, the child shall be returned to the natural parent
unless compelling reasons exist for keeping the child outside the
home.
On the other hand, if it is determined that a substitute par-
ent/child relationship has developed, the natural parent's claim
shall be denied unless the natural parent establishes that the
child's return will promote the child's best interest. In such a situ-
ation, the Court shall apply no presumption in favor of the natural
parent.
65
Under this approach the natural parent's traditional rights are pro-
tected only until a substitute parent-child relationship develops be-
tween the child and foster parent. The court believed that in foster
care, the child's interest requires placement with one who will be-
come the psychological parent, and that this relationship should be
encouraged, protected, and allowed to develop.
66
64. The best interests test requires a determination of whose custody would best enhance
the child's welfare. For a discussion of "best interests" and when this test is applicable, see
notes 14, 21-28 supra.
This case dealt with children who had been placed in foster care pursuant to a determina-
tion of deprivation. The court contended that if the children had been voluntarily placed, the
best interests test would still be applicable. The court relied on Stapleton v. Dauphin County
Child Care Serv., 228 Pa. Super. Ct. 371, 324 A.2d 562 (1974), for the proposition that the
"clear necessity" standard of deprivation cases applies only to the situation in which the court
is asked to disrupt an existing natural parent/child relationship. 125 P.L.J. 67, 74 (1977).
This conclusion is clearly contrary to the decision in In re LaRue, 244 Pa. Super. Ct. 218,
366 A.2d 1271 (1976), in which the court held that the "clear necessity" test applies in custody
disputes subsequent to the natural parents' voluntarily placing the child in foster care. In re
LaRue was decided six days prior to In re John F. and it is possible that the latter court had
not yet been advised of the higher court's determination.
65. 125 P.L.J. 67, 70 (1977) (emphasis added).
66. The court wanted to maximize "the child's opportunities for maintaining a continu-
ous relationship with one adult." Id. at 71. Furthermore, the court noted that "substantial
harm is presumed to arise from a child's removal from a good environment in which he or she
has resided for a lengthy time .... " Id. at 70.
Other states have recognized the importance of the psychological parents. In New York,
for example, the Court of Appeals in Bennett v. Marrow,-App. Div. 2d-, 399 N.Y.S.2d 697
(1977) aft'g, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 277, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1976), affirmed the lower
Foster parents' rights are expanding and are given a higher pri-
ority in custody disputes.67 Nevertheless, this expanding recogni-
tion is constrained by a statutory and regulatory scheme in which
foster parents continue to derive their standing solely through the
child's interest.6"
III. Emerging Independent Rights of Foster Parents
In addition to statutorily protected rights that are derived from
the child's interest, foster parents have asserted an independent right
to due process protection. They claim a "liberty interest"69 in the
integrity of the foster family, which qualifies for protection under the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. This right must be
examined in light of due process requirements and the impact of
court's award of custody to the foster mother rather than to the natural mother. The court
found that although the natural mother was able to provide the child with necessities, she was
unable to provide the child with needed emotional support. During the eight year custody
span, the foster mother had become the child's psychological parent, and their separation was
held to be potentially detrimental to the child. See Wald, supra note 10, at 667-68. Wald states,
It is claimed that children are injured in three ways unless they are guaranteed
stable placements. First, each time a child is separated attachments may be broken
generating insecurity and an inability to form future attachments. The inability to
form attachments may permanently impair a child's ability to form love relation-
ships. Second, subjecting children to multiple placements destroys continuities that
are important to the child's development. For example, with each new placement a
child must adjust to new adult expectations about appropriate behavior, a new physi-
cal environment and perhaps a new 'sibling,' peers, school, etc. Third, a child left in
foster care without a permanent home may be psychologically damaged by her un-
certain status. This may retard her socialization and cognitive development.
Id; see note 48 supra.
67. But see In re Johnson, 86 Ariz. 297, 345 P.2d 423 (1959) (when the court changed a
dependency finding no notice to foster parents was necessary, nor could foster parents present
evidence), Roussel v. State, 274 A.2d 909 (Me. 1971) (court denied foster parents the right to
keep the child in their home pending the hearing to contest the custody decision because other-
wise the efficient administration of the foster care system would be jeopardized).
Some states, however, are attempting to expand the rights and responsibilities of their
foster parents. For example, in California a bill was introduced that would authorize persons
licensed to provide foster care to consent legally to their foster child's ordinary medical and
dental care, participation in various school related activity, and joining and participating in
community oriented groups. Calif. AB 937 (Young). In Iowa, a bill was introduced that
would make foster parents liable for the torts of their foster children. Iowa SF 2031 (Kelly).
68. In Bennett v. Jeffireys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 552 n.2, 356 N.E.2d 277, 285 n.2, 387 N.Y.S.2d
821, 829 n.2 (1976), the court said,
Particularly rejected is the notion, if that it be, that third-party custodians may ac-
quire some sort of squater's rights in another's child. Third party custodians acquire
"rights"-really the opportunity to be heard-only derivatively by virtue of the
childs's interests being considered, a consideration which arises only after, as the
cases have always held, the parent's rights and responsibilities have been deplaced.
69. A "liberty interest" is a constitutionally protected right to liberty. Liberty is
not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to con-
tract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowl-
edge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to
the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recog-
nized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). See also Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215
(1976).
Smith v. Organization of Foster Familiesfor Equality and Reform, 70 a
key case in the area.
A. Due Process Standards of Review
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits
states from depriving persons "of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law." This guaranty demands both procedural and
substantive protection from arbitrary state action.
71
Although substantive due process requires that state laws do not
offend basic concepts of liberty and justice,72  satisfaction of sub-
stantive due process requirements depends on the nature of the dep-
rivation involved. If the state law infringes on a fundamental
interest73 or is based on a suspect classification,74 a strict scrutiny
test is employed to determine if this deprivation is justified by a com-
pelling state interest." If the law infringes on a protected interest
that is neither a fundamental interest nor the basis of a suspect clas-
sification, the deprivation need only be rationally related to a legiti-
mate goal of government.
76
To make a claim of deprivation of procedural due process, one
must demonstrate both the denial of a protected interest and the con-
stitutional inadequacy of the procedures used to deny the interest.77
Whether a protected interest is derived from constitutional guaran-
tees78 or state law, 7 9 procedural safeguards are required for its termi-
70. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
71. See genera//y Bice, Standards of Judicial Review Under the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clausea, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 689 (1977); Monaghan, Of "lZberty"and '?roperty" 62
CORNELL L. REV. 405 (1977).
Substantive due process guarantees that protected interests may not be contravened with-
out adequate justification. Procedural due process, on the other hand, guarantees that pro-
tected interests may not be denied without fair procedures, which are generally understood to
be notice and opportunity to be heard. The Court in Bodie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971) said that before a person is deprived of a protected interest, he must be afforded oppor-
tunity for some kind of hearing. Id at 379. The hearing required, however, is only one
"appropriate to the nature of the case." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
72. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 67 (1932). See also Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794-95 (1969). Substantive due
process protects those interests that have been incorporated from the first eight amendments in
the fourteenth, see, e.g., DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (first amendment rights)
and those that have been inferred from the Bill of Rights. See, eg., Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to marital privacy); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (right
to contract).
73. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
74. Suspect classifications include discrimination based on race, alienage, and legitimacy.
/5. See, eg., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942).
76. See, eg., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
77. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). See alo Eubanks
v. Clarke, 434 F. Supp. 1022, 1028 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (due process violations in transferring
mental patients from low security institutions to high security institutions).
78. These include express and inferred rights. See note 72 .upra.
79. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), the Court held that termination of state-
nation. To determine whether an interest is constitutionally
protected, one "must look not to the 'weight,' but rather to the nature
of the interest at stake." 0 Due process is flexible, however, in the
kinds of safeguards required to protect these interests once the inter-
ests are found."' No definite rule exists on what procedures are re-
quired. 2 Rather, the Court uses a balancing test to make this
determination by weighing the private interests at stake, the likeli-
hood of erroneous deprivation under the present system and the
probable value of additional procedures, and the Government inter-
est.
83
Since foster parents have alleged a liberty interest to obtain in-
creased procedural protection in custody disputes, the nature of their
interest must be within the interests protected by the fourteenth
amendment.84 In addition, the necessity of additional safeguards to
protect this interest must be demonstrated. The balancing test is ap-
plied by weighing the child's interest in a stable and emotionally sat-
isfying environment, the foster parents' interest in satisfaction of
their own and the child's emotional needs, and the Government's
interest in the preservation of the foster care system and in adminis-
trative convenience. Finally, the value and utility of additional pro-
cedural safeguards must be considered. The balance of these
interests will focus on the quality of the emotional bond in each fos-
created benefits was subject to due process constraints. Although the state was not required to
extend the benefits, once it did, the grantee's entitlement to the benefits was protected by the
due process clause. See, e.g., Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402
U.S. 535 (1971). But see Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S.
341 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (if government creates the interest, it can define
the scope of procedural protection that is required for termination of this interest).
80. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 (1972) (Court found no
hearing was required prior to "non-renewal of a nontenured state teacher's contract"). See
alo Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
Whereas interests "important" to the individual were once enough to implicate the due
process clause, Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), the Court now requires that the nature of
the interest be within the confines of the fourteenth amendment. E.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427
U.S. 215 (1976); Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
81. To say that the concept of due process is inflexible does not mean that judges are
no longer to apply it to any and all relationships. Its flexibility is in its scope once it
has been determined that some process is due; it is a recognition that not all situations
calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedures.
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972). Thus, due process "calls
for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (informal hearing was required by due process clause before the state
could revoke parole).
82. Cases in which the Court has applied this balancing test include, for example, Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); and Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McEl-
roy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
83. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
84. The importance of the foster parents' interest in the foster family to themselves and to
the foster child is not a determining factor.
ter parent/child relationship, for it is this bond that gives rise to the
liberty interest in the foster family. Therefore, whether foster fami-
lies have a liberty interest requiring added protection must be deter-
mined case by case.
B. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and
Reform 85
In Smith foster parents asserted a liberty interest 6 in the contin-
uance of the foster family. They alleged that New York's hearing
procedures for termination of foster care afforded them insufficient
due process protection of their right to family privacy.87 Basically,
New York's procedures provided foster parents ten days advance no-
tice of removal, a preremoval conference with the agency upon re-
quest and, subsequent to this conference, a full adversary
administrative hearing, subject to judicial review, with no stay or re-
moval pending the hearing and judicial review.8" A three judge dis-
trict court granted the foster parents declaratory and injunctive
relief, and state and city officials appealed.89 On appeal the
Supreme Court reversed, finding that whatever interest foster par-
ents have, these procedures were adequate to satisfy any due process
protection required.' This failure to reach the constitutional issue
is unfortunate, for its resolution is pivotal in determining the exist-
85. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
86. See note 69 supra for a definition of liberty interest. In the lower court, 418 F. Supp.
277 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (three judge court), foster parents also alleged a property interest in the
foster family, which they did not raise on appeal. If it had been considered, it is unlikely that
the court would have found such an interest to exist. Parents have no property interest in
children in the constitutional sense. See Commonwealth v. Kraus, 185 Pa. Super. Ct. 167, 138
A.2d 225 (1958). Furthermore, children are "persons" within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment and are entitled to due process protection. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1975); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
87. For discussion of the right to family privacy, see notes 97-100 and accompanying text
in#a.
88. For details of the New York removal procedure, see N.Y. Soc. Serv. L. §§ 383(2),
400, and 450.10 (McKinney 1976).
89. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform v. Dumpson, 418 F. Supp.
277 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (three judge court).
90. The Supreme Court endeavors to reach a decision on the narrowest grounds possible.
See, eg., Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring). In Smith, the Court said,
As this discussion suggests, appellee's claim to a constitutionally protected liberty
interest raises complex and moral questions. It is unnecessary for us to resolve those
questions definitively in this case, however, for like the District Court, we conclude
that 'narrower grounds exist to support' our reversal. We are persuaded that, even
on the assumption that appellees have a protected 'liberty interest,' the District Court
erred in holding that the preremoval procedures presently employed by the State are
constitutionally defective.
431 U.S. 816, 847 (1977).
Interestingly, the concurring opinion did not agree with the majority's cautious approach
toward the liberty issue and said, "Rather than tiptoeing around this central issue, I would
squarely hold that the interests asserted by the appellees are not of a kind that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects." Id at 857-58 (Stewart, J., concurring).
ence of a right in the foster parent independent of the child's. The
Court's analysis of the issue, however, is instructive.
The Court discussed two possible liberty interests of the foster
family9 '--the right "to be heard before being condemned to suffer
grievous loss ''92 and the "right to family privacy."93 Both of these
rights have been protected by the fourteenth amendment in other
contexts.94 Although the lower court found New York's procedures
constitutionally inadequate because disruption of a needed stable re-
lationship between the foster parent and child might constitute griev-
ous loss and, therefore, require due process protection,95 the
Supreme Court summarily rejected this reasoning. Rather, the
Court determined that such a finding of grievous loss did not, "in
and of itself, implicate the due process guarantee."96 Even though
91. The Court found that the foster parents had standing to assert either interest. Under
the grievous loss theory they were representing the child's right even though the child was
represented by independent counsel (who denied that children had the right to avoid grievous
loss). The Court noted that one may not ordinarily assert the "rights of another, himself a
party in the litigation; the third party himself can decide how best to protect his interests."
431 U.S. 816, 841 n.44 (1977). See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17,21-22 (1960); Tileston
v. Ullmar, 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943). See generally Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443-46
(1972); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). The Court, however, found that although
appointed counsel was necessary to represent children since they often lack the capacity to
protect their interests, appointed counsel is not their sole representative. Foster parents have
"sufficient attributes of guardianship that their views on the right of the children should at
least be heard, and hence, should be accorded standing." 431 U.S. 816, 842 n.44 (1977). As to
foster parents' standing under the family privacy theory, the Court said, "There can be, of
course, no doubt of appellees' standing to assert this interest, which, to whatever extent it
exists, belongs to the foster parents as much as to the foster children." Id at 842 n.45.
92. 431 U.S. 816, 840 (1977). See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 149 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See notes 94-95 and accompanying text
mfta
93. 431 U.S. 816, 842 (1977). See notes 99-100 and acompanying text infra.
94. Eg., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951) (grievous
loss theory). See also Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
For cases in which the Court has afforded families substantive due process protection see,
e.g., Moore, v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923). For cases in which families have received procedural protection see, e.g., Cleve-
land Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972);
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
95. 418 F. Supp. 277, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (three judge court).
96. 431 U.S. 816, 840 (1977). The Court relied on Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224
(1976), in which the Court said,
We reject at the outset the notion that any grievous loss visited upon a person by the
State is sufficient to invoke the procedural protections of the Due Process
Clause ....
Similarly, we cannot agree that any change in the conditions of [a prisoner's]
confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner involved is sufficient
to invoke the protection of the Due Process Clause.
In this case prisoners alleged a due process right to a pretransfer hearing when they were
reassigned to less desirable prisons. The Court found that a criminal conviction meeting con-
stitutional standards deprived a prisoner of his liberty interest. The Court in Smith appar-
ently recognized no distinction between a prisoner's rights and the foster child's rights. But
surely assignment to foster care does not extinguish the child's liberty interest. See C.V.C. v.
Superior Ct., 29 Cal. App. 3d 909, 106 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1973) (grievous loss theory entitled
the Court held the grievous loss theory to be inapplicable to foster
families, it conceded that the right to family privacy might apply.97
This latter interest of family privacy has long been recognized
by the Supreme Court as a liberty interest requiring due process pro-
tection.98 Many aspects of family life have been protected in this
manner" since, generally, there exists a "private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter."'' The issue addressed by the Court,
therefore, was whether the nature of the relationship between the
foster parent and child was sufficiently analogous to the concept of
"family" already protected to qualify for similar protection.' 0'
Although this Court did not resolve the issue, it noted several
similarities and distinctions between natural and foster families. It
recognized that although the concept of family was usually ' 2 under-
stood as a biological relationship, the real importance of the family is
in the emotional attachments and socializing functions. 10 3  Since the
foster family may provide both, the Court could not dismiss the fos-
preadoptive parents to procedural due -process). See generally Pearlman, Foster Parents'
Rights in Connecticut, 5 CONN. L. REV. 36 (1972) (greivous loss theory applied to foster par-
ents); Comment, The Foster Parents Dile)vna "who can I Turn to hen Somebody Needs
Me?" 11 SAN DinGo L. REV. 376, 404-05 (1974) (comparison of rights of preadoptive parents
and foster parents).
97. 431 U.S. 816, 842 (1977). Another claim for foster parents' liberty interest arises
under the justifiable expectation theory. The Court has found that a liberty interest can arise
when one has a justifiable expectation based on state law. Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236
(1976); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976). See also Saunders v. Packel, 436 F. Supp. 618
(E.D. Pa. 1977); Eubanks v. Packel, 434 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
The lower court, 418 F. Supp. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (three judge court), held that foster
parents had no justifiable expectation that foster placement would continue indefinitely. Fos-
ter parents are aware from the outset that placement is intended to be temporary, and the
potential for placement to last several years was not persuasive. According to Perry v. Sinder-
man, 408 U.S. 593, 603 (1972), "mere subjective 'expectancy"' is not protected by procedural
due process.
98. See cases cited in note 93 supra.
99. E.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) (freedom of
personal choice in family matters); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (procreation); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception).
100. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
101. 431 U.S. 816, 842 (1977). The Court stated, however, "recognition of a liberty inter-
est in foster families for purposes of procedural protections of the Due Process Clause would
not necessarily require that foster families be treated as fully equivalent to biological families
for purposes of substantive due process review." Id at 842 n.48.
102. Eg., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
Marriage and adoption, however, are two examples of relationships that are protected as
"families" and yet are not based on blood relationships. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965) (marriage relationship protected by right of privacy). See also Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
103. The Court said,
Thus the importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and to
the society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of
daily association, and. from the role it plays in 'promot[ing] a way of life' through the
instruction of children, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-233 (1972), as well as
from the fact of blood relationship.
431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977).
ter family as a collection of unrelated individuals. °4 Essentially,
the Court incorporated the role of psychological parent in the con-
cept of the family.'0 5
The Court made two important distinctions between the foster
family and the natural family. First, according to the Court, the
natural family derives its traditional liberty interest in family privacy
from "intrinsic human rights."'" The foster family, however, asserts
a liberty interest derived from a state-created contractual relation-
ship."°7 While this did not defeat their claim, the Court reasoned
that it was appropriate to measure foster parents' liberty interest by
the degree the state recognized their rights. Since New York ac-
corded their foster parents limited recognition, the Court would not
consider "any but the most limited constitutional 'liberty' in the fos-
ter family."'1 8
This approach, which necessitates a state by state examination
to determine which states confer a liberty interest to their foster par-
ents, seems reasonable only at first glance. A constitutionally pro-
tected right in the "family" should not be so arbitrarily determined
and protected. Instead, the Court should have found that all foster
parents who have a sufficiently natural, parent-like relationship with
their foster child have a liberty interest. The degree of protection
required to safeguard this interest, rather than recognition of the
existence of the interest, would vary with the extent of state recogni-
tion of foster parents' rights.
The second distinction made between the foster family and the
natural family was that the natural family's rights to family unity are
superior to those of the foster family. 'I Although the natural par-
104. Cf. Village of Belle Terre v. Borraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (zoning ordinance that pre-
vented more than two unrelated individuals to live together held constitutional).
105. The Court noted,
Mhis case turns not on the disputed validity of any particular psychological theory,
but on the legal consequences of the undisputed fact that the emotional ties between
foster parent and foster child are in many cases quite close, and undoubtedly in some
as close as those existing in biological families.
431 U.S. 816, 845 n.52 (1977).
106. 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977). See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
See also Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
107. According to the Court, however, "liberty interests may in some cases arise from
positive law sources .. " 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977). In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
557 (1974), for example, the Court recognized that
the State having created the right to good time and itself recognizing that its depriva-
tion is a sanction authorized for major misconduct, the prisoner's interest has real
substance and is sufficiently embraced within Fourteenth Amendment 'liberty' to en-
title him to those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and re-
quired by the Due Process Clause to insure that the State-created right is not
arbitrarily abrogated.
See note 79 supra.
108. 431 U.S. 816, 846 (1977).
109. It is one thing to say that individuals may acquire a liberty interest against arbi-
trary governmental interference in the family-like associations into which they have
ent may possess a greater liberty interest than does the foster parent,
this does not mean that the foster family lacks any liberty interest."'
Actually, the Court's reasoning suggests that the liberty interest of
the foster family may be more significant in custody disputes in
which the natural parent is not a party. Since many custody dis-
putes concern transfer of the child to another foster home, the ex-
isting foster parent's liberty interest should be superior to the
interests of the prospective foster parents.
Even if foster parents had a protected liberty interest, the Court
found that New York's state and city preremoval procedures provide
sufficient due process protection."' The Court determined that
automatic preremoval hearings were unnecessary because the Court
believed that foster parents who did not request a hearing presuma-
bly did not experience the strong emotional attachment to their fos-
ter child that gives rise to the liberty interest in the first place."
2
Moreover, the Court upheld the procedures even though the natural
parents and the foster child were not parties to hearings that re-
viewed plans to transfer the child to another home.' In addition,
the Court upheld a city procedure that did not extend hearing rights
to the foster parents when the child was to be returned to his natural
parents." 4 This resulted from a finding that "whatever liberty inter-
est may be argued to exist in the foster family is significantly weaker
in the case of removals preceding return to the natural parent, and
the balance of due process interests must accordingly be differ-
ent." 1
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freely entered, even in the absence of biological connection or state-law recognition
of the relationship. It is quite another to say that one may acquire such an interest in
the face of another's constitutionally recognized liberty interest that derives from
blood relationship, state law sanction, and basic human right--an interest the foster
parent has recognized by contract from the outset. Whatever liberty interest might
otherwise exist in the foster family as an institution, that interest must be substan-
tially attenuated where the proposed removal from the foster family is to return the
child to his natural parents.
Id at 846-47 (citations omitted).
110. See Note, Preadoptive Parents-ight to Due Process Hearing Prior to Custody Termi.
nation, 40 Mo. L. REv. 380 (1975) (an interest that would normally qualify for due process
protection does not lose that protection because the interest is incomplete, imperfect or lacks
certain elements). See also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
1I. See note 88 spra. City procedures are similar.
112. 431 U.S. 816, 850-51 (1977).
113. Id at 851-52.
114. Id at 853.
115. Id "[A] State does not violate the Due Process Clause by providing alternatives or
additional procedures beyond what the Constitution requires." Id at 853. Also, the Court
upheld a state requirement that the child live with the foster parent at least 18 months before
the foster parent was entitled to a preremoval judicial hearing. The Court stated,
If New York sees 18 months rather than 12 as the time which temporary foster
care begins toturn into a more permanent and family like setting requiring procedu-
ral protection and/or judicial inquiry into the propriety of continuing foster care, it
would take far more than this record provides to justify a finding of constitutional
infirmity in New York's choice.
C Judicial Interpretation of Smith
At least two courts have construed Smith. Neither court, how-
ever, found that foster parents have a due process right protected by
the fourteenth amendment.
In Drummond v. Fulton County Department of Family and Chil-
dren's Services, 1 6 foster parents appealed the agency's rejection of
their application for adoption of their foster child. The foster parents
were white and the child was of mixed heritage. The foster parents
claimed that the agency falsely used race as a criteria in rejecting
their application,I" and they asserted a liberty interest in the contin-
uance of their foster family."' The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
however, found that there was no such interest in this case." 9
Employing the reasoning of Smith, the court determined that the
process through which foster parents are selected in Georgia did not
give rise to a liberty interest in the foster family. Whereas Georgia
selected its adoptive parents on the basis of the quality of permanent
care they would give the child, it selected foster parents only in terms
of the quality of temporary care they would provide. 20 Hence,
Georgia considered the foster care relationship temporary from its
beginning. Furthermore, the court reasoned that foster parents had
no justifiable expectation that the relationship would continue undis-
turbed under Georgia's foster care system.' 2' Finally, the court
stated that foster parents could not have a "true" liberty right, be-
cause their interests flowed from repealable state laws rather than
from inherent human rights.'22 Although this analysis would also ex-
Id at 854-55.
116. 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977).
117. The court found that race is a relevant factor in the adoption decision if not used to
discriminate, and its use as a factor was not unconstitutional. Id at 1204. See also, United
Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. La. 1972) (three
judge court).
118. The Drummonds also asserted a liberty interest based on a "stigma to their reputa-
tion alleged to accrue upon the rejection by the agency of the application to adopt Timmy."
563 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1977). The court rejected this argument.
119. Id
120. The goal when selecting adoptive parents is "to duplicate the relationship that most
persons have with their natural parents during their entire lives." Id Foster parents, however,
are selected "only on the basis of the quality of temporary care they can be expected to pro-
vide." Id at 1207.
121. Id See note 97 supra. Moreover, the court found that the child had no personal
liberty right to a "stable environment." 563 F.2d 1200, 1208 (5th Cir. 1977).
122. True liberty rights do not flow from state laws, which can be repealed by action
of the legislature. Unlike property rights they have a more stable source in our no-
tion of intrinsic human rights. The very fact that the relationship before us is a crea-
ture of state law, as well as the fact that it has never been recognized as equivalent to
either the natural family or the adoptive family by any court, demonstrates that it is
not a protected liberty interest, but an interest limited by the very laws which create
it.
Id at 1207. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); note 79 supra.
clude adoptive parents from having a liberty interest since adoption
is a state-created relationship, parenthood by adoption is accorded
the legal status of natural parenthood.'23 Nevertheless, the court
found that Georgia's procedures, which offered foster parents virtu-
ally no due process protection, were constitutionally adequate.
24
Another case that relied on Smith is In Matter ofLouis F, 125 in
which foster parents had initiated a foster care review proceeding to
free their foster child for adoption. In this dispute with the natural
parent, the foster parents had been denied access through prehearing
disclosure to confidential agency reports regarding the foster child
and natural mother. The court affirmed this decision because it be-
lieved that foster parents' interests were adequately protected when
the availability of the records was premised upon both proof of ne-
cessity and prior screening by the court. 26  The rights of natural
parents were thereby protected by "encouraging open communica-
tion"'27 with the agency and by not allowing third parties to "ac-
quire some sort of squater's rights to another's child."'1
28
IV. Effects of Constitutional Claim on the Pennsylvania System
In Pennsylvania foster parents' rights have not been considered
in a constitutional framework. Comparison with the Court's analy-
sis of New York's system in Smith is instructive on the issue. Penn-
sylvania has recognized, as did the Supreme Court, that foster
families may function like natural families in providing a child with
necessary emotional support and socialization. 129 Therefore, like the
Supreme Court, Pennsylvania does not dismiss foster families as a
mere collection of unrelated individuals. Rather, the state respects
the interests of foster families by providing a statutory and regula-
tory scheme whereby foster parents enjoy certain rights with respect
to the child.' 3
As previously discussed, Smith suggests that the existence of
foster parents' liberty interest in that State' 3 1 is strongly related to
the existence of such provisions. Pennsylvania's procedures safe-
guard foster parents' interests to an even greater extent than do New
York's.132  Procedural similarities in the two systems include prior
123. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844
n.51 (1977). See note 102 supra.
124. 563 F.2d 1200, 1209-10 (5th Cir. 1977).
125. 42 N.Y.2d 260, 366 N.E.2d 824, 397 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1977).
126. I d at 261, 366 N.E.2d at 825, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 736.
127. Id
128. Id
129. See notes 16, 62-67 supra and note 144 and accompanying -text mf/a.
130. See notes 42-49 and accompanying text supra.
131. See notes 106-08 and accompanying text supra.
132. Compare the provisions in note 45 supra wilh those in note 88 supra.
notice of removal, an administrative hearing upon request, and the
recourse of appeal. Only in Pennsylvania, however, may the child
remain in the foster home pending appeal.' Therefore, under the
reasoning in Smith Pennsylvania's foster parents enjoy a liberty in-
terest at least as significant as and probably greater than New York's.
A. Suggested Approach to Recognition of a Liberty Interest
Although the existence of this interest in foster families is uncer-
tain so far, Pennsylvania should recognize this interest. Under its
present system foster parents' rights, responsibilities for and benefits
to the child are sufficiently analogous to those of natural parents to
require comparable constitutional protection." The foster family's
interest is within the protection of the fourteenth amendment be-
cause of its similarity to the natural family's interest. Just as adop-
tive families have been included within the concept of the family, so
should foster families who have achieved a natural family-like rela-
tionship.
In recognizing this interest, however, Pennsylvania should apply
a sliding scale to safeguard the liberty interest. Foster parents would
have the least extensive protection in custody disputes with the natu-
ral parents. 35 When these interests are balanced it is clear that natu-
ral parents have the superior constitutional interest. 36 Thus, the
extent of protection accorded foster parents would be limited in this
situation. Foster parents, however, would have the greatest protec-
tion of their liberty interest in conflicts with the agency. These con-
flicts may occur, for example, when the agency merely intends to
transfer the child to another foster home. The balance of these in-
terests would be in favor of the constitutional interest of the foster
parents and the emotional interest of the child and against the purely
133. Id
134. See notes 31-52 and accompanying text supra.
135. The Attorney General of Pennsylvania issued an opinion that foster parents have
procedural rights in the termination of foster care. Although he found statutory authority for
his opinion, his basic premises are equally applicable in this constitutional framework. He
stated,
We do not believe that the rights growing out of the fundamental family relationship
are less significant merely because the parent is a foster parent, rather than a natural
parent. A foster parent or a foster child necessarily develops the same feelings of
love and loyalty as a natural parent or child, and, indeed, departmental regulations
state that a major goal of foster care is to provide 'experiences in family living which
are essential to the child's growth and development when their own parents are un-
able to provide this.' § 4302(a). Moreover, when the family relationship is at stake,
the Supreme Court has looked to the reality of the emotional bonds, not to formali-
ties. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71-72 (1968).
4 PA. BULL. No. 27, at 1334 (June 11, 1974).
136. This is in accord with Pennsylvania law and Smith. See notes 8, 109 and accompany-
ing text supra. They may not have a superior statutory right, however, if the child had been
adjudicated deprived. See notes 21-28 and accompanying text supra.
statutory, legal interest of the agency. Finally, foster parents' rights
in comparison with those of prospective adoptive parents would be
more evenly balanced. In this situation, case by case determination
of whether it would be in the child's best interest to be relocated in a
permanent home with the potential adoptive parents or to remain in
the nonpermanent but emotionally satisfying home of the foster par-
ents must be made. This sliding scale approach to the degree of
protection required to safeguard the foster parents' liberty interest
offers the flexibility that a more uniform approach could not provide.
Through use of a sliding scale, consideration can be given to the
significance of each party's claim to custody; and the interests of all
the parties would be weighed more accurately.
B. Constitutionality of the Present System
If Pennsylvania recognized this liberty interest in the foster fam-
ily, would its present procedures provide constitutionally adequate
protection? The Court's approval in Smith of the sufficiency of New
York's procedures leads to the inference that Pennsylvania's provi-
sions would also meet approval since the termination procedures of
the two states are similar. 137  Pennsylvania, however, has afforded
foster parents more recognition in the foster care system than has
New York.138  Therefore, Pennsylvania's foster parents require
greater due process protection to safeguard a necessarily more sub-
stantial liberty interest.
Under the sliding scale approach the extent of additional safe-
guards required varies with the significance of the interests of the
parties to the custody dispute. First, foster parents' constitutional
rights in a custody dispute with the natural parents are adequately
protected because foster parents may achieve an equal status with
the natural parents when the child has been adjudicated deprived. 1
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One area in which foster parents should have more protection is in
obtaining access to confidential agency files.' 4° When it appears un-
likely that the natural parents will reclaim their child, foster parents
should have access to these files in preparing their case in a foster
care review proceeding to free the child for adoption. If the natural
parent/child relationship has deteriorated beyond repair, the foster
parents' interest in satisfying the child's needs deserves more protec-
tion than the constitutional interest of natural parents who have lost
137. Compare the provisions in note 45 supra with those in note 88 supra.
138. Id For example, in Pennsylvania, unlike in New York, foster parents may retain
custody of the child pending appeal
139. Both the natural parents and the foster parents would be required to prove that their
custody would serve the child's interesL
140. Contra, Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family and Children's Servs., 563
F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977).
actual interest in the child. Furthermore, the foster parents' interest
in this situation outweighs the agency's interest in encouraging open
communication with the natural parents.
Second, foster parents should have expanded procedural safe-
guards in disputes with the foster care agency. The former's consti-
tutional interest outweighs the latter's statutory interest. For
example, the agency should be required to meet a higher standard of
proof than "unsuitability" of the foster home when it attempts to
remove the child and relocate him in another foster home.' 4' This
higher burden of proof need not be as stringent as that which must
be met when the child is removed from his natural home 42, but un-
less the child is actually harmed in some way in the foster home, a
more compelling reason for removal should be demonstrated than
"unsuitability."
Last, foster parents appear to be adequately protected against
intervention by prospective adoptive parents. In Pennsylvania fos-
ter parents are given first priority when the child becomes available
for adoption.143 If their application for adoption is rejected, how-
ever, the agency should be required to prove that the prospective
adoptive parents will best serve the child's interest. Although it is
theoretically preferable for the child to be placed in a permanent
home, actual removal from a foster home in which close emotional
bonds have developed may be detrimental to the child.' 44
These examples suggest that Pennsylvania's recognition of this
interest would open new avenues of due process protection for foster
parents. The scope of these avenues would be determined on a case
by case basis considering all factors. The first issue to be resolved
would be whether that particular foster family possessed the quali-
ties of the natural family that give rise to the liberty interest. Then,
considering all the facts and Pennsylvania law, the extent of protec-
tion required must be determined.
V. Conclusion
Foster parents' rights have expanded within Pennsylvania's stat-
utory and regulatory framework. This expansion is largely the re-
sult of a growing realization that foster parents may best enhance the
child's welfare when they have become his psychological parents.
These rights, however, derive from the child's interest. In addition
141. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
142. The higher burden of proof is adjudication of deprivation and clear necessity for
removal See notes 21-22 and accompanying text supra.
143. Adoption Regulation § 2-1-66 states that "foster parents with whom a child is already
in placement shall be given priority consideration for adoption."
144. See notes 48, 66 supra
to statutory rights, foster parents have asserted an independent right
to constitutional protection of the foster family under the due proc-
ess clause of the fourteenth amendment. Like expanding statutory
rights, these developing constitutional rights are based on the con-
cept that the foster family may function like a natural family and,
therefore, deserve comparable constitutional status. Although the
constitutional issue has not been conclusively determined by the
Supreme Court, its resolution could have a significant impact on fos-
ter parents' rights in Pennsylvania. Foster parents would enjoy due
process protection in areas other than termination of foster care, par-
ticularly in decisions made and activities controlled by the foster
care agency.
Foster care is a crucial program for the welfare of children.
Certainly they should receive the best care possible. As foster parents
may provide. this care, there is added impetus for Pennsylvania to
recognize a liberty interest in the foster family. Its recognition can
only serve a primary goal of foster care, protecting the child.
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